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The concept
intersectionality has been employed since
Crenshaw introduced it in 1989. In per-
haps the most influential of the early arti-
cles dealing with intersectionality she writes
about domestic violence towards women of
colour (Crenshaw 1991). She explains that
because of the intersections between class
matters (unemployment, poverty, etc.),
race1 matters (in, for instance, social ser-
vices) and gender matters (heterosexual
partnerships, motherhood, etc.) these wo-
men have specific experiences (Crenshaw
1991) shaped by the ways the different dif-
ferentiations intersect. Importantly these
women share the experience of having their
bodily integrity violated through domestic
violence. 
Meyers emphasizes, in line with Cren-
shaw, the centrality of experience in inter-
sectional thinking when she notes that:
“The idea of intersectional identity is
premised on the general philosophical the-
sis that who one is depends on one’s social
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The debates about intersectionality
have been running for a number of
years. Experience has been part of the
debates, but the embodied dimension
of experience tends to be forgotten.
How can the inclusion of embodied
experience be fruitful for an inter-
sectional analysis?
experience” (2000: 153). In other words,
the relational and social formation of inter-
sectional identity takes place through a
wide range of social experiences and these
experiences differ in ways, which are related
to gender, class, ethnicity, and race etc.
(Phoenix and Pattynama 2006). 
We aim in this article to relocate the dis-
cussion about intersectionality and suggest
a perspective on embodied experience as a
means of broadening studies of the individ-
ual as intersectional as well as researching
the power relations that affect the social
construction of individuals. We are inspired
by the corporeal turn in sociology and vi-
sual sociology (Taussig 1993, Buck-Morss
1994, Crossley 1995, Skeggs 1997, Samp-
son 1998, Witz 2000, Bourdieu 2000, En-
twistle 2000, Gebauer and Wulf 2001,
Wacquant 2004, Young 2005, Shilling
2007, Bacchi and Beasley 2007). These in-
spirations enable us to reconsider the rela-
tion between individuality and embodi-
ment and to sketch out our perspective on
embodied experience. We consider this per-
spective an important alternative to the
current focus on discursive identity con-
struction although it does not exclude the
importance of discourses. 
Embodiment and intersectionality are
complex concepts and approaches, which
we necessarily have to address in a simpli-
fied manner given the limits of this article.
We use the concept of embodiment to de-
note the processes through which the social
is incarnated in human beings, whereas we
consider intersectionality a conceptual
metaphor for the mutually constitutive in-
terplay and interwovenness between differ-
ent forms of social differentiation. 
Our discussion raises two aspects. The
first is the question of experience. As men-
tioned, notions of experience have implicit-
ly been part of intersectionality debates. We
wish to strengthen an embodiment per-
spective in the discussion about experience
as this has largely been absent in intersec-
tionality debates. Secondly, the debate
about structure versus agency has found a
new home in the discussions about inter-
sectionality. We find that strengthening the
embodiment perspective could enable a re-
thinking of the binary figure of structure
vs. agency. 
INSPIRATION FROM PHENOMENOLOGY
The inspirations we draw upon are directly
or indirectly related to Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological understanding of sub-
jectivity as embodied (Merleau-Ponty
1963, Dauer-Keller 2001). Young sums up
the achievements of Merleau-Ponty for
contemporary thinking in the following
way:
Within the phenomenological tradition, Mer-
leau-Ponty took the revolutionary step of
theorizing consciousness itself as embodied.
The subject who constitutes a world is always
an embodied subject. […] There is no situa-
tion […] without embodied location and in-
teraction. Conversely, the body as lived is al-
ways layered with social and historical mean-
ing and is not some primitive matter prior to
or underlying economic and political relations
or cultural meanings (Young 2005: 9).
However, she notes, the critiques in recent
French philosophy inspire scepticism of
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of consciousness,
which “assumes the subject as unitary and
original to experience” (Young 2005: 9).
Furthermore she suggests that we leave the
expectation behind, detected in some of
Merleau-Ponty’s writing, of a “pure em-
bodied experience” prior to social condi-
tioning and structural positioning (ibid).
Young maintains, however, that the inspira-
tion from Merleau-Ponty is still fruitful.
This is not least the case for our under-
standing of intersectional individuality. It
inspires us to scrutinize whether analyses of
narratives and discourses tell us enough
about intersectionality ‘at work’. As the
subject is “always an embodied subject”
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(ibid) and as embodiment is necessarily
shaped by its material and social conditions,
as we will explain below, this formation is
radical, in that it not only affects material
and sensational aspects of embodiment, but
also the thoughts and the consciousness in-
tertwined herein. This embodied individual
experience is what Merleau-Ponty calls “the
phenomenological world”:
The phenomenological world is not pure be-
ing, but the sense which is revealed where the
paths of my various experiences intersect, and
also where my own and other people’s inter-
sect and engage each other like gears. It is
thus inseparable from subjectivity and inter-
subjectivity, which find their unity when I ei-
ther take up my past experiences in those of
the present, or other peoples in my own
(Merleau-Ponty 1963: xviii).
It is important to note the deeply relational
nature of experience Merleau-Ponty de-
scribes here. He states that the world as we
experience it – “the phenomenological
world” – is what is happening where differ-
ent experiences – ours as well as others –
engage each others like gears. The claim is
that while embodiment is material in the
middle of materiality, it is also perception
shaped by the perceived; it is relational and
deeply situated (Crossley 1995: 48). In re-
lation to our focus on social positioning as
a situated, embodied process, we find Mer-
leau-Ponty’s idea that other people’s expe-
riences engage in our ‘own’ striking. 
It follows from Merleau-Ponty that be-
cause different social differences are em-
bodied in the same embodiment, it is nec-
essarily intersectional. As lived embodied
experience social differences are always in-
tersectional. Intersections of gender, class,
ethnicity, race, sexuality, etc. affect what we
experience as it is woven into our percep-
tions, into how we are perceived by others,
how others treat us, how others’ experi-
ences engage in ours, where and how we
live, what we do, how empowered we are,
which groups we participate in, how ‘nat-
ural’ our surroundings seem, etc.
Phenomenological thinking of embodi-
ment has been criticized by feminist schol-
ars for being gender biased (Cawood and
Juelskjær 2005, Young 2005, Moi 2005).
Cawood and Juelskjær criticize Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology for “speaking of a
concrete ideal of the body, masked as the
body in general” (Cawood and Juelskjær
2005: 20). The critique finds Merleau-Pon-
ty to be speaking of the body in terms that
are too general, and to be forgetting that
embodiment is radically differentiated.
While we recognize this tendency in some
of Merleau-Ponty’s writing, we find that
with inspiration from Merleau-Ponty’s un-
derstanding of experience as embodied, we
can explain how gender and other social
differences are embodied. The radicality of
the phenomenology of embodiment is
therefore not antithetical to an analytical
sensitivity to gender. 
Cawood and Juelskjær, furthermore, ar-
gue that the phenomenological under-
standing of an embodied individual, which
reaches out into the world in an unrestrict-
ed way is based on an understanding of
male bodies. However, to us the “unre-
strictedness” (Cawood and Juelskjær 2005:
20) of embodied participation is not the
central insight of Merleau-Ponty’s phe-
nomenology. If perception of the world is
shaped by “various experiences” (Merleau-
Ponty 1963, cited above) – our own as well
as others’ – our ‘reach out’ will always be
restricted by the horizon of all these experi-
ences. As we reach out and act in the physi-
cal world we are also being exposed to and
shaped by social differentiations and power
structures. 
It is precisely this feature of the body,
the quality of being and having to be ex-
posed and open to the world, which neces-
sarily creates differentiated embodiment.
In other words to the extent the body is
not gendered, classed, racialized, etc. in
prior phenomenological thinking this is
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not due to problems in the basic premises
of this thinking per se, but due to these
premises not being driven to their conse-
quences in this respect. Moi makes an at-
tempt at this when she reads Merleau-Pon-
ty’s formulations about embodied percep-
tions as the background for all agency up
against Beauvoir’s thoughts on the female
body as the gendered background for the
agency of women (2005: 91-93). Moi
quotes Merleau-Ponty’s foreword to Phe-
nomenology of perception where he claims
that: “The world is not an object such that
I have in my possession the law of its mak-
ing; it is the natural setting of, and the
field, for all my thoughts and all my explic-
it perceptions” (Merleau-Ponty 1963: x-xi,
cited from Moi 2005: 195). This under-
lines our perceptions as being radically
conditioned by our world, while it, as Moi
points out, also outlines the body as “what
we are” as well as “the medium through
which we are to have a world” (2005:
195). In her reading of Merleau-Ponty
Moi writes: “To consider the body as a
background is to allow that its importance
for our projects and sense of identity is
variable” (2005: 196). She thus sees the
possibilities of grasping differing identity
and agency experiences within Merleau-
Ponty’s thinking. However, drawing upon
Beauvoir, Moi argues that Merleau-Ponty
does not take into account that in a patriar-
chal society, women to a much higher de-
gree than men have to understand them-
selves as gendered bodies (2005: 196).
From an intersectionality perspective it can
similarly be argued that Western colonial
thought has understood black men as
mindless bodies (Mercer and Julien 1988).
One main point of thinking intersectionali-
ty as embodiment is then to break with the
idea that some groups or individuals are
more embodied than others. This idea pre-
vails in contemporary white masculine
thought, which has a tendency to consider
other groups than white men in terms of
the body – and white men in terms of ra-
tionality and the mind (Schott 2004).
However, to work with intersectionality
means to include the majority in the ana-
lytical object (Staunæs 2004). Here we in-
sist, with Merleau-Ponty, that there can be
no social life without embodied exposure
to the world, and therefore the social life of
all human beings has an embodied dimen-
sion. 
To us Merleau-Ponty, furthermore, in-
spires an understanding of experience as
embodied beyond cognitive and discursive
productions of meaning. In our under-
standing experience can have an embodied
dimension, which comes from being in
touch with the world, sensing it, and not
necessarily decoding it in ways that rely up-
on discursive repertories. Consequently in
our understanding of experience we differ
from authors who have criticized the con-
cept of experience from a discursive point
of departure. Scott, for instance, criticized
feminist standpoint theory, which claimed
that engagement with women’s experiences
is a prerequisite for an adequate under-
standing of gender (1991, 1992). As Mc-
Nay has noted, standpoint feminism’s no-
tion of experience is problematic because
the idea that taking women’s experience as
a direct path to valid knowledge of gender
represents something dangerously close to
empiricism (2004: 178 ff). Against the
epistemological problems of standpoint
feminism, Scott argued that experience is
always discursive, because it is interpreted
through discursive repertoires (Scott 1991,
1992). 
The epistemological problems pointed
out by Scott persist in the theoretical histo-
ry of the intersectionality concept for in-
stance when Collins argued that thinking
intersectionally corresponds with the way
black women experience the world (1990).
This ‘theoretical primacy’ of black women
as the intersectional subject par excellence
has been criticized by Gans (2008). 
We consider Scott’s critique valid in the
sense that women’s narratives about experi-
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ences of gender are neither unaffected by
discursive repertoires, nor offer a privileged
entrance point to understanding gender.
However we want to argue for the possibil-
ity of a non-cognitive and radically embod-
ied understanding of experience as some-
thing that forms all subjects (i.e. not just
women or black women). 
Summing up, Merleau-Ponty offers ar-
guments that the social life of all human
beings has an embodied dimension and
that there are bodily dimensions of experi-
ence, which do not have to be discursively
mediated as they do not work on the basis
of representations, symbols, or signs. 
THE MIMETIC FACULTY
The complexities of embodied experience
can be explored further by addressing the
mimetic faculty. Early in the century devel-
opmental psychologists researched this fa-
culty in order to understand the socializa-
tion of children (Gebauer and Wulf 2001)
and Benjamin (1936/1994) wrote about it
in relation to sensory and aesthetic experi-
ences and the perception of media (Elg
2009). 
Benjamin describes the mimetic faculty
as a capacity to “become other” (1936/
1994). Mimesis is then a name for the im-
pulse to embody what we are sensing as a
result of a spontaneous creativity (Elg
2009: 33). This takes shape as an ability to
imitate what we sense. The ability to imi-
tate – and to ‘overtake’ and reproduce the
imitation as embodiment – is crucial for the
reproduction of practices and for learning
(Bourdieu 2000: 134). Furthermore, the
mimetic faculty provides an ability and a
predisposition to spontaneously empathize
with other beings and their emotions
(Bråten 1998). It therefore produces a
sensed connection to the bodies of other
beings. Imitating and empathizing are
closely intertwined as it is through imita-
tion between bodies that affective connec-
tion is produced. Socially spontaneous
mimicking and empathizing are thus crucial
for how relations unfold and for how the
individual will be constructed in concrete
situations (Elg 2009). 
Pierre Bourdieu has built his theory of
habitus upon these ideas, and he claims
there is a biological, neurological dimen-
sion of this mimetic faculty (2000: 134).
He describes the embodied engagement in
the world as effecting a “durable transfor-
mation of the body”:
… to speak of dispositions is simply to take
note of a natural disposition of human bodies
[…] a conditionability in the sense of a natur-
al capacity to acquire non-natural, arbitrary
capacities. To deny the existence of acquired
dispositions is to deny the existence of learn-
ing in the sense of a selective, durable trans-
formation of the body through the reinforce-
ment or weakening of synaptic connections
(Bourdieu 2000:136, emphasis in original). 
This also means that the embodied individ-
ual is continuously exposed to social struc-
tures. McNay points out: “The habitus is in
a state of permanent revision, but this revi-
sion is rarely radical because the new and
unexpected is always incorporated upon the
basis of previously established, embodied
dispositions” (2001: 151). In this sense our
thinking runs contrary to, for example,
Giddens’ idea of the body as part of a re-
flexive project of the self, altered by the in-
dividual in accordance to his or hers prefer-
ences (Giddens 1991). To us, the embodi-
ed individual has agency, but it is impossi-
ble to choose not to be exposed to social
relations or not to be conditioned by one’s
experiences (Bourdieu 2000:142). This, of
course, implies openness towards power
structures as well. 
The embodied being is always individual
and personal as well as collective. Thus,
Bourdieu maintains that the body “indis-
putably functions as a principle of individu-
ation” (Bourdieu 2000: 133). The body in-
habits a specific point in space (socially and
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physically) and it can, beyond infancy, con-
tinue living without symbiosis with other
bodies. However the body is also a “princi-
ple of ‘collectivization’” (ibid.) since it is
literally a product of collective existence
and formed by its social and material envi-
ronment, which is shared with others. 
Thus, the mimetic ability to be con-
structed by its environment provides the
individual with dispositions for agency that
are in tune with the worlds in which it acts.
Bourdieu points to a very important aspect
of this intimate relation between the em-
bodied being and the world when he insists
that this agency to a large extent is not
achieved through a cognitive decoding of
signs in the surroundings. As we are condi-
tioned we are also “oriented towards the
world” (Bourdieu 2000: 142) and able to
provide an “adequate response, having a
hold on it, using it (and not decoding it) as
an instrument well at hand” (ibid.).
Summing up, the concept of the mimetic
faculty offers an understanding of how the
social is embodied through mimetic rela-
tions with other beings. 
CHALLENGING BUTLER
Due to its thematic familiarity we find it
relevant here to consider Butler’s influential
work on the body as discursively construct-
ed (Butler 1993). The theory of embodi-
ment we have outlined implies that a focus
on discourses will not entail the whole
spectre of the social construction of the hu-
man individual (Elg 2009). Hence from
this perspective Butler treats the material
and sensational qualities of the body too
lightly (Lykke 2008: 83, Bacchi and
Beasley 2007, Sampson 1998, Young
2005, Witz 2000, Hughes and Witz 1997).
Approaching the intersectional individual as
embodiment implies at least two claims
that come to terms with Butler. One prob-
lem, often detectable in Butler-inspired un-
derstandings of the body, is that her discur-
sive approach tends to treat the body as a
surface, with social meanings appearing as
bodily signs on it to be read (for instance
Staunæs and Søndergaard 2006: 46, 50).
In the words of Witz the body appears in
Butler’s writings as a “surface given mean-
ing through discourse” (2000:8). This is
problematic because the body then appears
open for inscription, but is not itself active
in the process of socialization. However,
with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and
the concept of mimesis we argue that the
body is a site for action and not “raw mate-
rial” (Lykke 2008: 99) for the inscription
of social meaning. 
To illustrate these processes further we
can employ Hasse’s concept of sprezzatura
(2002), which denotes how a sense of what
is appropriate is embodied in a mimetic re-
lation to others. Her study analyses how
appropriate ways of being a physics student
are learned in collective non-discursive
processes, which rely largely on bodily ges-
tures such as gazes and facial expressions. 
Similar processes can be said to be at
work when we learn, for instance, appropri-
ate gender identity. The point is that, as
McNay notes: “The acquisition of gender
identity does not pass through conscious-
ness […] bodily dispositions are […] lived
as a form of ‘practical mimesis’” (1999:
101). For instance Crossley points out that:
“Women talk differently from men” (2007:
85). In an intersectionality perspective we
should of course add that ways of speaking
also depend on class and race or ethnicity.
However, we find it fruitful to maintain
that such differentiated ways of talking are
learned in mimetic processes that the body
actively seeks to engage in. 
A second, but related, problem in But-
ler’s approach is the understanding of the
mimetic faculty implied in her critique of
Bourdieu: “For Bourdieu, practical mimeti-
cism for the most part works, and this
achieved congruence between field and
habitus establishes the ideal of adaption as
the presiding norm of his theory of sociali-
ty” (Butler 1999: 118).
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Butler reads the “practical mimeticism”
in the work of Bourdieu as an ideal of
adaption; a normative aspect of Bourdieu’s
theory rather than valid sociological obser-
vation. To us pointing to adaption is an ob-
servation, not the articulation of an ideal.
In fact Bourdieu is fully aware that adap-
tion also serves as a vehicle of domination
(2000). Therefore we find Butler’s critique
of this observation normatively puzzling.
The critique can be related to a tendency in
Butler-inspired social constructionism:
While it mentions the reality of structural
or collective formation of individuality it
has a tendency to consider it an ideological,
normative obstacle that should be over-
come (Prins 2006). This tendency could al-
so be called normative, as it takes shape as
an ideal of liberation from adaption. As we
have shown above, we do not find that
adaptations such as acquired dispositions
are added to the individual in a way that
makes it possible to be liberated from
them. From our point of view the “durable
transformation” (Bourdieu 2000: 136) is a
basic feature of human embodiment, which
is a necessary, although powerful, dimen-
sion of engagement in social relations.
RETHINKING STRUCTURE AND AGENCY
As mentioned in the introduction the de-
bate about structure and agency has found
a new home in the intersectionality discus-
sion. For instance Prins (2006) divides in-
tersectional thought into systemic and con-
structionist approaches (Phoenix 2006).
According to Prins, the systemic approach-
es take individuals “to be the passive bear-
ers of the meanings of social categories”
(2006: 280). That could be rephrased as
being positioned within pre-defined cate-
gories that you have no possibility of ac-
tively influencing. In contrast Prins de-
scribes the constructionist understanding of
intersectionality as implying “that the indi-
vidual is […] made into a source of his or
her own thinking and acting” (2006: 280). 
It seems that Prins’ categorization is in
fact an euphemized way of speaking of
structure and agency. It is then an example
of the structure vs. agency division being
rearticulated within the intersectionality de-
bate. From an embodiment perspective this
division is problematic, as it can be argued
that the distinction is maintained, because
the complex character of embodied experi-
ence is not taken into account. Putting em-
bodied experience into the equation offers
a way to rethink this division, because the
body is never fully individual or fully collec-
tive, and because embodiment is at the
same time socially conditioned and a site of
agency. 
As argued above, embodiment is always
structured as it works through experiencing
conditions of life shaped by gender, class,
ethnicity, race, etc. However, embodiment
at the same time provides the individual
with agency. Through mimesis the indi-
vidual achieves practical knowledge about
how to do things like use tools, dance, or
socialize at a dinner party. The continued
practical engagement in the world accumu-
lates a practical sense. That is, through en-
gagement with the world a repertoire for
action, and a sense of which actions are re-
levant in which contexts is continuously
created as embodiment. Therefore, embo-
diment generates a practical rationality,
which does not rely on analytical conceptu-
alization. The responsiveness inherent in
this practical rationality should be recog-
nized as agency. 
An illustration of embodiment as a site
of agency is found in Dreyfuss and Drey-
fuss’ phenomenology of human learning
(Flyvbjerg 2001). According to Dreyfuss
and Dreyfuss human learning does not
consist of learning to reflexively apply con-
text-independent rules. Analytical problem
solving is only one specific type of human
action. On the contrary Dreyfuss and Drey-
fuss maintain that human action at the ex-
pert level is intuitive, holistic and embod-
ied. It “comes primarily from the experi-
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ences on one’s own body and is in this way
at one with the performer” (Flyvbjerg
2001: 18-19). Dreyfuss and Dreyfuss pro-
vide the example of experienced paramedics
performing more adequate treatment to
persons with acute heart failure compared
to trainees learning to give first aid. Despite
not remembering, or perhaps never have
been introduced to, the formal rules of first
aid from which the trainees act, the experi-
enced paramedics provide the most ade-
quate treatment, because their experience
provides them with an embodied, intuitive
sense of the relevant actions (Flyvbjerg
2001: 10).
The overall point is that it is the exact
same processes of socialization by which we
learn capacity for agency that condition us
in a powerful ways. As a consequence of
the perspective on embodied experience we
have outlined above, it is therefore possible
to argue that structure and agency are not
different empirical phenomena, but differ-
ent dimensions of the same phenomena.
With embodiment as point of departure,
any focus on agency and not structure must
then be seen as strictly analytical. Embod-
ied being will always be both.
CONCLUSION
In this article we have outlined an under-
standing of the socially constructed individ-
ual as intersectionally embodied. This em-
bodiment is open to the world and it has
an impulse as well as a need to engage in
the world; to socialize. For this reason em-
bodiment is also socially conditioned. With
the mimetic faculty it is formed by this en-
gagement. Furthermore, it accumulates ca-
pacity for action and agency by this engage-
ment. Another way to say this is that the
individual is formed by the experiences the
embodied being has throughout its life as it
is engaged in the social world by necessity.
These experiences are shaped by gender,
class, ethnicity, race, etc. since our intersec-
tional positioning to a very high degree af-
fects how we are perceived by others, how
others treat us, how ‘natural’ we are per-
ceived to be by our surroundings, etc. In
this sense intersectionality works as embod-
iment. 
NOTE
1. We use the category ‘race’ with reluctance, since
the human, social differentiations grasped by this
concept will never be, strictly speaking, racial.
However, since race is the name of social differen-
tiations in society as we know it, it is a term social
science cannot do without.
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SUMMARY
Intersectionality as embodiment.
This article explores intersectionality as em-
bodiment, arguing that by taking embodi-
ment into account broader possibilities of in-
tersectional analysis can be unfolded. In-
spired by phenomenological theories of embo-
died experience and the mimetic faculty, the
article suggests that intersectionality can be
understood as embodied experience. Follow-
ing this thinking embodiment is radically
conditioned as well as a site of agency. This
has implications for the understanding of
structures, agency as well as their interrela-
tion.
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